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The Ratification of the Treaty of Münster (1648), oil on copper, by Gerard ter Borch. The Peace of Westphalia was the result of two different
treaties signed in 1648—one in Osnabrück and one in Münster—ending the Thirty Years’ War and the Eighty Years’ War. (Image courtesy
of Wikimedia Commons)
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odern international law came into existence at the end of the Thirty Years’ War in
Europe.1 Horrified by the unprecedented
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destruction of a series of wars over religion, European
negotiators at Westphalia coined the phrase “cuius
regio, eius religio.”2 Literally translated, it means “whose
111

(Sources: Various German atlases and G. Duby, Grand Atlas historique, Paris, Larousse, 1997. © Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques [FNSP], or National Foundation of Political
Sciences/Sciences Po, Cartography workshop, 2018. Map courtesy of Espace mondial, l’Atlas)

Europe after the Westphalia Treaties, 1648
Signed in 1648 by nearly all the European powers with the exception of England and Russia, the Westphalia treaties put an end to the
Thirty Years’ War between Protestants and Catholics. In addition to reshaping the territory of Europe, they laid the groundwork for the
international system organized on the basis of sovereignty by virtue of which each political entity is recognized as being sovereign within
its borders. This political model gave rise to the concept of the modern state, which holds the monopoly of legitimate violence over its
territory and relies on a national army to ensure its border security.

realm, his religion.” It could be loosely translated to
mean, “No more interference in the internal affairs of
other nations. We leave them alone and they leave us
alone.” The legal term for this principle is sovereignty,
or the legal supremacy of a government over its actions
and policies within its territory. As a practical matter, it meant that seventeenth-century governments
in Europe were legally free to persecute their citizens
for their religion without concern for international
112

repercussions. The goal of the Westphalia negotiators
was to ensure that there would be no repeat of the
Thirty Years’ War or any similar struggle.
The principle of sovereignty would go completely
unchallenged for over 250 years, until the end of the
First World War. Before attending the peace conference at Versailles in 1919, U.S. President Woodrow
Wilson delivered his “Fourteen Points” speech and
revealed that the American negotiating position would
July-August 2021
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include demands that nation-states respect human
rights and not use sovereignty as a shield for protecting
their actions from scrutiny, criticism, or international
action. Points ten to thirteen made Wilson’s rejection
of sovereignty plain:
X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose
place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the
freest opportunity to autonomous development.
XI. Rumania [sic], Serbia, and Montenegro
should be evacuated; occupied territories
restored; Serbia accorded free and secure
access to the sea; and the relations of the
several Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically
established lines of allegiance and nationality;
and international guarantees of the political
and economic independence and territorial
integrity of the several Balkan states should
be entered into.
XII. The Turkish portion of the present
Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure
sovereignty, but the other nationalities which
are now under Turkish rule should be assured
an undoubted security of life and an absolutely
unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships
and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.
XIII. An independent Polish state should be
erected which should include the territories
inhabited by indisputably Polish populations,
which should be assured a free and secure
access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity
should be guaranteed by international covenant.3
(italics added)
Wilson was asserting the right of the international
community to oversee the protection of the named ethnic groups from abuses, even from, or especially from,
their own governments. While attractive as a principle,
Wilson’s concept of human rights possessed by groups
set off a cycle of forced migrations, ethnic cleansing,
and persecution that resulted in almost as many deaths
in the two years after World War I as had occurred
during the war’s last two years.4 In a sense, the damage
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Wilson wrought did not end there but simply went into
abeyance to reemerge in the savage wars that followed
the breakup of Yugoslavia. With all of the bloodletting
in the immediate aftermath of Wilson’s innovative
international law proposal, it is not surprising that
Europe soon insisted on a return of sovereign rights
and the principle of noninterference in the internal
affairs of other nations.
The concept of state sovereignty, at least as established at Westphalia, had a short second career,
however. The revelation of the Holocaust caused not
only horror among Europeans at the end of the Second
World War but also deep and abiding guilt. Rumors
of death camps had emanated from Nazi-occupied
Europe long before the end of the war. Irrefutable evidence of severe human rights abuses under the Nazis,
the Italian fascists, and the Soviet communists, including other instances of mass murder, had appeared as
early as the mid-1930s and had been almost completely
ignored by Western leaders who used sovereignty as
their excuse for inaction.5 A new dawn for human
rights protection in international law appeared.

Human Rights Treaties
Among the first actions by diplomats in the aftermath of World War II were efforts to update and
strengthen the Geneva Conventions, the first of which
originally came into force in 1864.6 This first effort had
asserted the rights of wounded soldiers. A subsequent
convention, signed in 1929, had listed protections that
had to be provided to
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They protected individuals as part of narrowly defined groups under narrowly defined circumstances.
Moreover, they were perceived as an elaboration of
international law as it pertained to limits on warfare,
which Europeans had accepted centuries before. Even
this acceptance was based more on self-interest and the
fear of retaliation for the mistreatment of wounded soldiers and/or prisoners of war than on a commitment to
human rights per se.
Still, the Geneva Conventions established two
radically new concepts for the international legal
community. First, they were based on the principle that
sovereign states were in fact answerable to the international community for actions taken against individuals.
Up until that time, the only individual human beings
protected by international law were diplomats and
heads of state. Second, the concept of human rights was
extended from the group rights asserted by Wilson at
Versailles to the far more comprehensive concept of
human rights for individual persons.
The Geneva Conventions were updated and
strengthened after World War II, and two more conventions were added. A provision of the 1907 Hague
Convention, guaranteeing protection for wounded
sailors, was extended to all armed forces personnel on
the seas. A vague mention of the rights of civilians in
the Hague Convention became the Fourth Geneva
Convention, “relative to the protection of civilian
persons in time of war.”8 Illustrative of the hesitation
negotiators showed in embracing the concept of human
rights, the Geneva protections still applied only to
defined groups in defined circumstances.
The next major step toward an international
human rights regime was the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights of 1948.9 The preamble called
“recognition of the inherent dignity” a “foundation
of freedom, justice and peace in the world.”10 It noted
that “contempt for human rights [has] resulted in
barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience
of mankind” and later averred that human rights
protection under the law “is essential to promote the
development of friendly relations between nations.”11
This last assertion significantly eroded the idea of
sovereignty by linking human rights protection with
peace, a belated admission that effective opposition
to massive human rights abuses in Nazi Germany
might have prevented World War II.
114

The Universal Declaration presented a long list of
specific human rights, from freedom of speech to parental rights over their children’s education. However, it was
a statement of principles passed by the United Nations
General Assembly. As such, it was not legally binding on
the signatories. Violators could be accused of hypocrisy
but not of illegality. Even given the solely aspirational nature of the declaration, the prerogative of states to limit
rights was also included. Article 29 notes, “Everyone has
duties to the community,” and adds, “In the exercise of
his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only
to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the
purpose of … meeting the just requirements of morality,
public order and the general welfare in a democratic
society” (italics added).12
A government’s right to suspend rights was made
much more explicit in the 1950 European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms.13 Article 15, section 1, reads: “In time of war
or other public emergency threatening the life of the
nation any High Contracting Party may take measures
derogating from its obligations under this Convention
to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international
law.”14 The only rights that cannot be derogated are the
rights to freedom from torture and slavery.
This section goes far toward negating the remainder of the treaty, and it certainly could not
have given much comfort to enthusiasts for human
rights at the time that it was signed. First, the treaty
contains no definition of such key terms as “public
emergency,” “threatening the life,” “exigencies,” or
“strictly required.” A high contracting party is perfectly free to define such circumstances as broadly
and as self-servingly as it wishes, subject only to the
obligation that it “keep the Secretary-General of the
Council of Europe fully informed of the measures
which it has taken and the reasons therefor.”15 For
that matter, even “war” is left undefined.
Second, the phrase “its obligations under this
Convention” is seemingly innocuous but highly significant. The high contracting parties are legally permitted
to enter into the treaty because they are sovereign
states. As such, they have agreed to obligate themselves
to respect and uphold the various rights listed in the
treaty’s other articles, unless they invoke Article 15.
July-August 2021

MILITARY REVIEW

HUMAN RIGHTS

This language makes it plain that as sovereign states,
they are the original and natural “owners” of the rights
listed, and these rights are granted to citizens by the
sovereign state. Thus, as rights granted by a state, they
can be taken back by the state.
This concept of human rights is the opposite of the
concept contained in the U.S. Bill of Rights. The first
ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution make it plain
that the government of the United States is obligated
to recognize, respect, and uphold rights such as freedom of speech and religion that the citizens already
have and that they had, as human beings, before the
Constitution was written or amended. The Declaration
of Independence had stated the principle even more
clearly, noting that human beings are endowed with
rights “by their Creator.”16 One of the central arguments against including the provisions of the Bill of
Rights in the original document was the prevailing view
among the delegates to the Constitutional Convention
that no reasonable person could fear that the American
government would ever doubt the inherent nature
of the rights listed in the Bill of Rights. Even if some
future government did fail to acknowledge them, a
second American Revolution would quickly follow.
MILITARY REVIEW
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After fleeing turbulence in the Ottoman Empire, Armenian and
Syrian refugees wait in quarantine between 1917 and 1919 at an
American Red Cross camp outside Jerusalem. (Photo courtesy of
the Library of Congress)

The great majority of global human rights treaties reverse the Constitution’s concept of the origin
and “ownership” of human rights. The European
Convention, for example, begins with, “[t]he High
Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within
their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined
in Section I of this Convention.”17 Article 2 provides
that “everyone’s right to life shall be protected by
law,” but it does not comment on the origin of that
right, and the phrasing makes it plain that neither
the right to life nor any other right can be considered
“unalienable.”18 Article 2 also grants exceptions to the
right to life for the death penalty, for deaths incurred
while making arrests or preventing escapes, or due to
“action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a
riot or insurrection.”19
The 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees seemingly protects stateless persons from
115

discrimination, saying in Article 4 that “[t]he Contracting
States shall accord to refugees within their territories
treatment at least as favorable as that accorded to their nationals with respect to freedom to practice their religion.”20
But the same document stipulates in Article 9 that
nothing in this Convention shall prevent a
Contracting State, in time of war or other
grave and exceptional circumstances, from
taking measures which it considered to be
essential to the national security in the case of
a particular person, pending a determination
by the Contracting State that that person is
in fact a refugee and that the continuance of
such measures is necessary in his case in the
interests of national security.21
Once again, the apparent “rights” of refugees originate
with the state and can be discontinued by the state.
The 1965 European Social Charter significantly expands the number of rights granted to citizens, including economic and financial rights as the right to “just
conditions of work,” the right to vocational guidance,
the right to social security, and the right to organize,
among others. However, Article 30 repeats almost verbatim the language of the European Convention:
In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any
Contracting Party may take measures
derogating from its obligations under this
Charter to the extent strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation, provided that such
measures are not inconsistent with its other
obligations under international law.22
Again, the only accompanying obligation for the contracting parties is to keep the Council of Europe informed.
Other regional human rights treaties are equally vague on the origin of human rights. The 1969
American Convention on Human Rights, also known
as the San José Pact, begins by “recognizing that the
essential rights of man are not derived from one’s being
a national of a certain state, but are based upon attributes of the human personality.”23 This perambulatory
clause was included at the insistence of U.S. representatives. But the pact still gives governments wide latitude
in deciding when human rights can be “suspended,”
a provision that reverts ownership of human rights
to the nation-state. Article 27 states: “In time of war,
public danger, or other emergency that threatens the
116

independence or security of a State Party, it may take
measures derogating from its obligations under the
present Convention to the extent and for the period of
time strictly required by the exigencies of the situation,
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with
its other obligations under international law.”24
The following section of Article 27 stipulates that
even in times of “public danger or other emergency”
the state may not suspend the right to a juridical personality, the right to life, the right to humane treatment, the right to a name, the right to nationality,
and the right to participate in government. Under the
same article, governments may not suppress freedom
from slavery, impose ex post facto laws, or interfere
with freedom of conscience and religion.
While this part of the San José Pact seems to protect a number of individual rights, even during a crisis,
other documents seriously undermine the reality of
that protection. The Charter of the Organization of
American States, for example, prohibits nations from
taking any action against a state that violates human
rights. Article 15 of the charter, for example, contains
unusually airtight language: “No State or group of
States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external
affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle
prohibits not only armed force but also any other form
of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its political, economic, and
cultural elements” (italics added).25
Article 17 is even more comprehensive: “The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object,
even temporarily, of military occupation or of other
measures of force taken by another State, directly
or indirectly, on any grounds whatever. No territorial
acquisitions or special advantages obtained either by
force or by other means of coercion shall be recognized”
(italics added).26 Given these provisions, which were
not superseded by the San José Pact, it is difficult to
see what recourse an individual has if his or her rights
are violated. The rights of the nation-states to internal
sovereignty receive much better legal protection.
The 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights added a new dimension to the international
law of human rights. It expanded the concept of rights
to cover not only individual human beings but also
groups of human beings.27 While originally written
July-August 2021
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to protect the autonomy of ethnic and tribal groups
in Africa, the language of the charter provides little
comfort to those committed to the idea of inherent
and unalienable human rights.
The African Charter contains an initially impressive list of individual human rights, including freedom
of movement, the right to an education, the right to

[their] physical and intellectual abilities at its service,”
to “preserve and strengthen social and national solidarity,” and to “contribute to the best of his abilities, at all
times and at all levels, to the promotion and achievement of African unity.”34 While the rights of individuals are balanced with purported duties, the rights of
peoples are subject to no such restrictions.

Even in times of ‘public danger or other emergency’
the state may not suspend the right to a juridical personality, the right to life, the right to humane treatment,
the right to a name, the right to nationality, and the right
to participate in government.
“enjoy the best attainable state of physical and mental
health,” the right to medical attention, and the right to
“freely take part, in the cultural life of his community.”28 However, the document is replete with assertions
of the rights of states to make laws limiting rights. A
guarantee of the right to liberty, for example, makes an
exception for “reasons and conditions previously laid
down by law.”29 Other articles contain similar language:
Article 8, “subject to law and order”; Article 9, “within
the law”; Article 10, “provided he abides by the law”;
Article 11, “restrictions provided for by law”; and
Article 12, “in accordance with the law.”30
When the charter switches from individual rights
to peoples’ rights, however, such restricting language
disappears. Article 19, for example, states, “Nothing
shall justify the domination of a people by another.”31
No provision of law serves as an exception or justification. Article 20 uses words to describe peoples’
rights omitted in the articles on individual rights:
“All peoples shall have the right to existence. They
shall have the unquestionable and inalienable right to
self-determination.”32
Individual human rights are also limited by another
innovation in the African Charter, a chapter devoted to
duties. Article 27 warns that “the rights and freedoms
of each individual shall be exercised with due regard
to the rights of others, collective security, morality and
common interest.”33 Article 29 asserts the duty of individuals “to serve [their] national community by placing
MILITARY REVIEW
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Constructing Rights at
Home and Abroad
Who then may vindicate the right to existence?
In response, who defends the duty of security? As
the international treaty context illuminates, how
governing authority defines a right—collective or
individual—informs the availability of a route and a
remedy. In application, each approach poses unique
challenges. Group rights may present unstructured
overbreadth while simultaneously failing to deliver a
concrete means of redress or a practical acknowledgment of sovereignty; individual rights may narrowly
circumscribe both rights and sovereignty, generating
conflict and strangling both in exceptions and duties.
Conscious of these limitations, the international
context highlights similarities and distinctions domestically, illuminating unique U.S. challenges to the
future of defining the relationship between human
rights and national sovereignty.

Constitutional Commitment
to Individual Rights
Despite leading with a rhetorical acknowledgment
of “We, the People,” the U.S. Constitution begins and
ends its collective concepts there, with few exceptions.
Distinct from the African Charter’s articulation of
both individual rights and peoples’ rights, the closest operative constitutional parallel is the distinction
between person and citizen; in either case, a singular
117

construction. In text and practice, an individual
rights approach permeates American legal history.
Particularly consistent through Chief Justice John
Roberts’ era, since 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court’s
interest in the structural and institutional value of an
individual rights paradigm remains at the forefront of
its interpretations.
The court’s historic interpretation of constitutional
rights and remedies begins from a practical and procedural support of individual rights. Article III of the
Constitution establishes the judicial branch, limiting the
Supreme Court’s authority to preside over “cases” and
“controversies.” This core of the American adversarial
process requires an aggrieved party to assert an individualized injury to sustain a reviewable case. In Marbury
v. Madison, the Supreme Court first articulated the role
of judicial review in relation to a private, individual right
of action.35 There, the court also carved out an exception for political issues that the judiciary lacks authority
to interpret, excluding the political functions of other
branches from judicial review. Further defining this
principle, Supreme Court cases limit the ability to claim
a right and pursue an action, absent a “concrete and particularized” injury that is “actual or imminent, not
118

Endorois people celebrate the return to their land 18 May 2011 at
Lake Bogoria National Reserve in the Great Rift Valley of Kenya. In the
1970s, hundreds of Endorois families were evicted from their traditional lands to create a wildlife reserve. (Photo by Denis Huot, Hemis
via Alamy Stock Photo)

conjectural or hypothetical” for which a judicial remedy
is possible.36 These individualized elements form the
threshold doctrine of standing. Absent these elements,
the American legal system is not empowered to consider
violations of substantive rights in any form. Standing criteria are inherently individual and cannot be easily satisfied by collective generalizations. As such, the American
judicial system’s adjudication of all rights constitutionally
begins from an individual paradigm.
Illustrating the specificity required by this individual rights approach, domestic courts routinely reject cases absent an actualized, articulated injury that produces standing. In Clapper v. Amnesty International USA,
the Supreme Court rejected a form of collective rights
strategy from a coalition of petitioners challenging the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Amendments
Act of 2008 to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.37
July-August 2021
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There, legal challengers were “attorneys and human
rights, labor, legal, and media organizations whose
work allegedly require[d] them to engage in sensitive
and sometimes privileged telephone and e-mail communications with colleagues, clients, sources, and other
individuals” under threat of government surveillance.38
The court’s majority rejected its alleged injury of suspected surveillance and costs to avoid it as insufficient,
nonspecific, and ineffective to confer individualized
standing on the group. The rejection reversed a 2011
court of appeals decision in 2013. Consistent with an
individual rights framework, the court requires specific
allegations of a concrete injury; cumulative concern or
speculation will not suffice. Significantly, the majority,
including Roberts, asserts that this structural demand
is fundamental to American government.39
By comparison, the African Charter contemplates
a broad range of possible petitioners and relationships
to the ultimate remedy. From individuals and nations
to nongovernmental organizations asserting rights on
behalf of people or groups, this range of potential parties sharply contrasts the strict individual rights paradigm memorialized in U.S. standing limits. In Centre
for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority
Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare
Council v. Kenya, the African Commission on Human
and Peoples’ Rights applied the African Charter’s
group provisions to define rights and remedies due
the Endorois people, the vehicle for those claims was
a case initiated by a nongovernmental organization
on behalf of an unrelated group of persons.40 Therein,
the commission acknowledged the “debate” engendered by attempts to define peoples and indigenous
populations, ultimately finding in favor of the nongovernmental organization, and by extension the land
rights of the Endorois community. This expansive,
unmanageable breadth of rights, through a collective
approach, is not without consequence. While ultimately finding that Kenya violated provisions of the
African Charter with respect to the indigenous group,
the 2003 complaint was not adjudicated until the
commission’s 2010 order. The attenuation between
these dates for a single adjudication is not surprising;
in a collective rights context, concrete specificity and
practicality are necessary trades for this breadth.
Beyond the procedural threshold of standing
and who can assert a claim, the Roberts Court has
MILITARY REVIEW
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overwhelmingly approached substantive constitutional
interpretation from an individual rights perspective.41
In rejecting a collective rights approach to the Second
Amendment, the Supreme Court reiterated its commitment to an individual rights framework in District
of Columbia v. Heller, reasoning,
Three provisions of the Constitution refer to
“the people” in a context other than “rights”—
the famous preamble (“We the people”), §
2 of Article I (providing that “the people”
will choose members of the House), and
the Tenth Amendment (providing that those
powers not given the Federal Government
remain with “the States” or “the people”).
Those provisions arguably refer to “the people” acting collectively-but they deal with the
exercise or reservation of powers, not rights.
Nowhere else in the Constitution does a
“right” attributed to “the people” refer to anything other than an individual right.42
Rejecting Washington, D.C., handgun legislation
as unconstitutional, the majority reasoned that
the Second Amendment “unambiguously” protects
“individual rights,” not “collective rights,” in the same
way individual rights and remedies are secured by the
First, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments.43 Dismissing
the appearance of people and militia in the text of the
Second Amendment, the court’s majority steadfastly
and unsurprisingly maintained that this language can
only create an individual right in practice. The court
holds that the alternative, in a system designed for individual rights claims, would be no right at all.
As to both the procedure and substance of domestic legal interpretation, the Roberts Court remains
consistently committed to a specific, individual rights
framework of constitutional interpretation.

Individual Rights
and National Security
In the international context, such as Article 27 of
the African Charter, duties curtail and balance individual rights, while collective rights may escape this
conflict analysis entirely. If the international context
is instructive, the Roberts Court’s commitment to
defining individual rights domestically can expectedly
abut government duties and limitations. Such contexts
may require balancing state interests like sovereignty,
119
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or carving more precise duties from the individual
rights framework. The uncharted territory of domestic
individual rights is at their intersection with government duties and interests. Examples of this intersection in the context of national security and detention
are illustrative of this point.
Internationally, government laws and duties necessarily intersect with individual rights frameworks;

however, this is not a reason to abandon the individual
rights paradigm in favor of a broad group construction.
In Good v. Botswana, the African Commission applied
an individual rights framework to reach a tailored
remedy in a fraction of the time the commission required to navigate complex, attenuated collective rights
assertions.44 There, Botswana’s President Festus Mogae
ordered the deportation of Professor Kenneth Good,

an Australian national who published critical writings
on government policy. Botswana’s domestic courts
promptly dismissed Good’s appeal of the unreviewable executive order, resulting in Good’s removal
on fifty-six hours’ notice and prompting his action

enduring institutional benefit of a specific individual
rights paradigm. For example, in the 2004 and 2008
court decisions of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Boumediene
v. Bush, the Supreme Court employed an individual
rights approach to find that Guantanamo Bay detainees

From national security and foreign affairs to migration,
government duties in both the domestic and international context pose conflicts and overlap systems of individual rights.
before the African Commission. Applying Articles
7 and 12(4) of the African Charter, the commission
rejected Botswana’s assertion that executive action
evades all procedural processes under a sweeping
national security justification.
In response, the commission intentionally reinforced the symbiotic relationship between a specific
individual right and a robust acknowledgment of local
laws and duties.45 The commission effectively reasons
that both are best served by centering adjudication in
a specific, predictable system. To achieve this balance,
the commission found in Good’s favor but only to the
extent that deportations must be executed within the
specific, predictable, lawful process of the state, which
included due process notice and the opportunity to
be heard. In this holding, the individual rights system
not only coexists with but also significantly reinforces
the central importance of domestic law and institutions. Far from abandoning national institutions or
denying an interest in national security and sovereignty, only a specific, individual rights paradigm aims
to balance these coextensive realities in practice.
Likewise, the Roberts Court’s approach to national
security, foreign affairs, and detention cases articulates specific, individual rights balanced by government duties with an emphasis on institutional process.
Mirroring the African Commission’s individual rights
reasoning in Good, the Supreme Court considers the

possess the individual right to habeas corpus.46 Literally
translated, “produce the body,” the right and remedy of
habeas corpus petitions is limited to appearing before
a judicial arbiter and receiving notice of the reason for
detention. Much like Good, the Supreme Court considers singular habeas corpus challenges within the context
of existing domestic law and institutions.
Since Boumediene, the Supreme Court has declined to
certify many unanswered questions of national security,
instead making district courts of appeal the final arbiter
in the balance of rights, duties, and American institutional integrity. In applying the Roberts Court’s precedent, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
employed an individual rights approach in Al-Aulaqi
v. Obama and found the balance of state sovereignty
weighed in favor of American political institutions.
There, the district court rejected a petitioner’s claims
that U.S. officials unlawfully authorized the targeted
killing of his son, a dual U.S.-Yemeni citizen in Yemen,
who had alleged ties to al-Qaida. In a ruling consistent
with the Roberts Court’s balance of individual rights, the
district court acknowledged both substantive and procedural arguments, declining to reach the merits of the
claims, and instead focused on the procedural limits of
government duties, relying on both the political question
doctrine and standing:
Whether the alleged “terrorist activities”
of an individual so threaten the national

Previous page: A Turkish soldier stands guard 21 September 2014 with several hundred Syrian refugees at a border crossing in Suruc, Turkey.
Turkey opened its border to allow in up to sixty thousand people who massed on the Turkey-Syria border, fleeing the Islamic militants’ advance
on Kobani. (Photo by Burhan Ozbilici, Associated Press)
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security of the United States as to warrant
that military action be taken against that
individual is a “political judgment[ ] …
[which] belong[s] in the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion
or inquiry.” … Because decision-making in
the realm of military and foreign affairs
is textually committed to the political
branches, and because courts are functionally ill equipped to make the types
of complex policy judgments that would
be required to adjudicate the merits of
plaintiff ’s claims, the Court finds that the
political question doctrine bars judicial
resolution of this case.47
The district court further considers the structural endurance of the American judicial system in declining
to extend a limited and disfavored concept of “third
party” standing for the parent of an adult child, absent an injury that “affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal
and individual way.”48 The dismissal is not a rejection
of the individual rights paradigm; it is consistent with
a specific exception for government duties.
In this narrow construction, the district court in
Al-Aulaqi reaches the opposite decision of Good for
the same reasons. In Good, the injury of deportation
existed within national borders, subject to domestic
laws and institutional process, while in Al-Aulaqi, the
injury existed extraterritorially. Whereas a group
rights approach overlooks the nuances of place, state
sovereignty, domestic law, and institutional limitations, an individual rights paradigm in both cases
allows for these considerations. Both cases balance
individual rights in this way, preserving the centrality
of domestic institutions at home and abroad.

The Domestic Future of Rights
With the addition of three justices under the
Trump administration, a newly constructed Roberts
Court has a host of challenges on the horizon to its
individual rights framework. From national security
and foreign affairs to migration, government duties
in both the domestic and international context pose
conflicts and overlap systems of individual rights.
When confronted with such conflicts, one approach
may be to loosen the Roberts Court’s commitment
to individual rights by exploring a collective rights
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approach. This argument obviates the need to confront these challenges directly, and keeps with the
trajectory of international human rights treaties.
However, the group rights paradigm runs counter to
constitutional principles and presents an unchecked
and unmanageable alternative that the Roberts Court
has consistently opposed.
This landscape faces the newly constructed
Roberts Court. When it does, in a departure from
international trends, the court likely will continue to
favor the specificity of an individual rights approach
and its institutionalist motivations. The Supreme
Court’s commitment to an individual rights framework will likely be tested in the near future. Three
pending cases, in different procedural postures,
including recently petitioning the Supreme Court, are
presently before the D.C. federal courts; all consider whether individual due process rights inure to
Guantanamo Bay detainees.49 This specific, individual
right is not yet defined with respect to government
duties through the Supreme Court’s habeas corpus
rulings. While undecided at present, the Roberts
Court’s construction of a specific individual rights
paradigm, as applied to those national security and
detention cases, almost certainly foreshadows a similar outcome. Using the framework discussed herein, if
certiorari is granted, the court is likely to approach Ali
v. Trump, Al Hela v. Trump, and Nasser v. Trump with
the same institutionalist individual rights analysis.50
Predictably, the court will measure and temper its individual rights grant with the government duties and
sovereign interests presented.
Ultimately, the Roberts Court is unlikely to deconstruct its own scaffolding of a specific individual
rights system. Instead, the examples discussed in this
article prove significant. While individual rights constructions may abut government decision-making,
the Supreme Court will nonetheless stay the course
and center specificity and process in its balance. Far
from eroding respect for law, an individual rights
paradigm centers institutional endurance. Informed
by this greater context, an institutionalist Supreme
Court will continue to advance an individual rights
framework as it navigates new factual controversies.
The Supreme Court’s domestic answer to the question, “Whose rights?” for now sounds like “Maybe
yours, maybe mine, but definitely not ours.”
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